On the Desirability of Coordinated Supply-side Intervention: Does a Monetary Union Matter? by Carmen Díaz-Roldán
243 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 5-6
UDC: 338.23:336.74; 339.738
Keywords: monetary union – supply-side policies – policy coordination
On the Desirability of Coordinated
Supply-side Intervention: Does
a Monetary Union Matter?
Carmen DÍAZ-ROLDÁN*
1. Introduction
When deciding the convenience of forming a monetary union, a question
broadly discussed is that, due to the disappearance of domestic monetary
policies and an independent exchange rate, national governments would
have to deal with shocks mainly using fiscal policy. However, the discipli-
nary effects of a monetary union may require some discipline on fiscal po-
licies; we can mention, as an example, the limitations imposed by the Pact
for Stability and Growth in the European monetary union. As a conse-
quence, it would be desirable to have other alternative policies available,
and, among them, the possibility of using supply-side policies has been dis-
cussed – see (Vi~ nals – Jimeno, 1998), (De Miguel – Sosvilla, 2001), (Hug-
hes Hallet – Viegi, 2001) among others.
In this paper we examine the desirability of coordinated supply side in-
tervention and the extent to which the formation of a monetary union could
change the desirability of coordination. To this end, we first analyze the to-
pic in a two-country model. Secondly, we modify the model so that the two
countries form a monetary union, where an independent central bank con-
trols monetary policy within the monetary union, but supply policies are
still determined by the authorities at a national level.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the theoreti-
cal framework; in section 3, we study the desirability of supply-side policy
coordination between countries; and section 4 concludes.
2. The Theoretical Framework
2.1 A Two-country Model
The starting point will be the standard two-country Mundell-Fleming mo-
del, extended to incorporate the supply side. The model developed in this
* Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha and centrA, Spain
(carmen.diazroldan@uclm.es)
I wish to thank Oscar Bajo-Rubio, as well as the participants at the 54th International At-
lantic Economic Conference (Washington D.C., October 2002), and a seminar in the Depart-
ment of Economics at Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, May 2003), for their comments and sug-
gestions. Financial support from Fundación BBVA, and the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Technology, through the project SEC2002-01892, is also gratefully acknowledged. Of course,
all the remaining errors are my own.
s_243_251  25.5.2004  17:44  Stránka 243paper is an extension of Díaz-Roldán (2003), and consists of two symmetric
economies, country 1 and country 2, with flexible exchange rates and per-
fect capital mobility between them, along the lines of the classical litera-
ture on coordination – see (Oudiz – Sachs, 1984), (Cooper, 1985), (Canzo-
neri – Gray, 1985), (De Bonis, 1994), among others.
The set of equations for country 1 is as follows, and a similar setup is used
for country 2:
y1 = –  r +  (e + p2 – p1) +  y2 + f1 (1)
m1 – p1 =  y1 –  r (2)
pc1 = (1 –  )p1 +  (p2 + e) (3)
w1 –  pc1 =  prod1 –  u1 + z1 – v1 – t1 (4)
p1 – w1 = –  prod1 –  u1 (5)
y1 = n1 + prod1 (6)
u1 = l1 – n1 (7)
All the variables are defined as rates of change, except r and u that cap-
ture the instantaneous changes in the interest rate, and in the unemploy-
ment rate, respectively.1All parameters, denoted by Greek letters, are non-
negative.
Equation (1) represents the goods market equilibrium condition. Output,
y, depends on the world’s interest rate r, the real exchange rate e + p2 – p1
(derived from the nominal exchange rate and the domestic prices of the two
countries), the other country’s output, and a positive real shock f.
Equation (2) shows the money market equilibrium condition, where m de-
notes the money supply, and money demand depends on domestic output,
and the world interest rate.
Equations (3) to (7) represent the aggregate supply of the economy, built
along the lines of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). Equation (3) defi-
nes the consumer price index pc, as a weighted average of the domestic 
goods’ and the imported goods’ prices in terms of the domestic currency.
Equation (4) shows that nominal wages, w, are determined by the degree
of indexation with respect to the consumer price index, depending on pa-
rameter  ; labour productivity, prod; the unemployment rate, u; wage pres-
sure factors, z; the error in expectations, captured by the variable v; and
the use, as a policy instrument, of a supply-side variable t, which could be
used as a direct way of policy intervention in the labour market. Notice that
the parameter   denotes the degree of wage rigidity, with 0       1.
In equation (5), prices are set by adding a margin to wages, which de-
pends on productivity, and the unemployment rate. We also assume that
the parameter   is the same as in the wage-setting equation (4), as in (Layard
– Nickell – Jackman, 1991).
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1 Notice that, as usual in the literature on coordination, we assume that the change in the ex-
pected inflation rate and the change in the expected rate of change of the exchange rate, are
both zero. This imply that thenominal interest rate equals thereal interest rate, and that thedo-
mestic interest rate equals the world’s interest rate.
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changes in employment, n, and productivity; and equation (7) defines chan-
ges in the unemployment rate, in terms of labour force, l, and employment.
2.1.1 Transmission of the Shocks
Solving the model given by equations (1) to (7) and their counterparts for
country 2, and assuming equilibrium in the goods market, we can obtain
the reduced forms for the two countries2 – see (Díaz-Roldán, 2002) for fur-
ther details. Therefore, the interaction of the variables shows interdepen-
dence between the two countries.
We find that a negative supply shock, always leads to a fall in output and
a rise in prices in both countries.
In turn, positive demand shocks lead to positive effects on the output and
prices of the country of origin of the shock. But when the shock is trans-
mitted between the two countries, the sign of the coefficients depends on
which channel of transmission prevails. In our model, the channels of trans-
mission of the demand shocks are the aggregate demand, the interest rate,
the nominal exchange rate, and the countries’ relative prices. When aggre-
gate demand prevails, the result is the “locomotive effect”: we find an ag-
gregate demand expansion coupled with an output expansion and a rise in
prices in all the involved economies. But when changes in the interest rate
and the real exchange rate prevail, the result is the “beggar-thy-neigh-
bour effect”: the effects on the output and prices of the country of origin of
the shock are transmitted to the other country with the opposite sign.
2.2 The Model for a Monetary Union
In order to describe a monetary union, the two sets of equations for count-
ries 1 and 2 are modified as follows: the nominal exchange rate is made
equal to zero; and both countries replace each individual money market
equilibrium condition (equation (2) for country 1, and the symmetric one
for country 2) by a common equilibrium condition:
11   m – –– p1 – –– p2 = –– y1 + –– y2 –  r (8)
2 222
where m denotes now the union’s money supply.
Notice that, since all the variables are in rates of change, the variables
of the monetary union are equal to the weighted sum of the member count-
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2 Equations (1) to (7) together with the set for country 2, would make a system of 14 equations
with 14 endogenous variables: y1,y 2,p 1,p 2,r ,e ,p c 1,p c 2,w 1,w 2,u 1,u 2,n 1 and n2. The exogenous
variables would be the policy instruments t1 and t2, as well as the monetary (m1,m 2), real (f1,
f2) and supply (prod1, prod2,z 1,z 2, v1,v 2,l 1 and l2) shocks.
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country 2 respectively; Y, Y1, Y2 are their levels of output, and Y1 + Y2 = Y. 
For simplicity, we will assume:  =  =  .
2.2.1 Transmission of the Shocks
In a similar way as the two-country model, we can obtain the reduced
forms for the monetary union’s member countries – see (Díaz-Roldán, 2002)
for details.
For a negative supply shock, we also find an output fall and a rise in pri-
ces in both countries.
Regarding demand shocks, a real shock may lead again to both the “lo-
comotive effect” or the “beggar-thy-neighbour effect”, when transmitted to
the other country. However, in contrast to the two-country model, a mone-
tary union does not allow for country-specific monetary shocks.
3. Supply Policies Coordination
3.1 The Optimization Problem
We assume that countries 1 and 2 are represented by their authorities,








2 +  2p2
2 (10)
where the target variables are the rates of change in both output (y1, y2),
and prices (p1, p2). The authorities use as their policy instrument the supply
side variable (t1, t2), and we assume  1    2 (i.e., we consider asymmetric
preferences). Given the quadratic form of the loss functions, they will be
minimized when the target variables are equal to zero.
As for the monetary union, the loss functions are now:
L1 = y
2
1 +  1g
2




2 +  2g
2
2 +  2p2
2 (12)
where assuming that the disciplinary effects of a monetary union imply
some restrictions on fiscal policy, we include the budget deficit (g1, g2) as
a target variable, with  1    2. An example of this situation is the Euro-
pean monetary union, where each member country has to fulfill the budget
deficit requirements of thePact for Stability and Growth. On theother hand,
although in a monetary union an independent central bank controls mone-
tary policy, prices are included as a target variable again, so that we try to
capture the cost of the authorities’ intervention in terms of inflation.
In both cases (the two-country model and the monetary union), the count-
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framework (i.e., the reduced form equations for each country). By solving
the minimization problem of each country, we obtain the policy reaction
functions of the authorities; and the competitive or Nash solution will be
the intersection of these functions. However if the authorities decide to co-
operate they will minimize the weighted sum of their individual loss func-
tions, so obtaining the cooperative solution.
In order to avoid the spillover effects of their policies, the countries’ au-
thorities will identify stabilization with avoiding changes in the policy 
instrument. So, the authorities will choose the solution (competitive or
cooperative) that requires the lowest change in the policy instrument.
3.2 Graphical Analysis
In this section, we will compare the competitive solution and the coope-
rative solution in graphical terms. In absence of shocks, the reaction func-
tions, R1 and R2, of the two countries cross through the origin of the figu-
res. But, after suffering a disturbance, the reaction functions shift to the left
or to the right depending on the kind of shock. In these cases, the bliss
points are denoted by B1 and B2.
3.2.1 Desirability of Supply Policy Coordination in a Two-country
Model
Figure 1 shows the reaction functions after an expansionary (demand or
supply) shock in both countries. The Nash solution is at point N, where
the reaction functions intersect. There are infinite cooperative solutions,
along the line linking the intercepts of the reaction functions, but we focus
on the case in which both countries react in the same way, t1 = t2. In that
case, the solution is given by point C in Figure 1; and, according to the cri-
teria stated above, cooperation would be undesirable because it requires
a greater change of the policy instrument.
In a similar way, as in the case of a contractionary (demand or supply)
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undesirable (see Figure 2).
In  Figure 3 we depict the case of a contractionary supply shock in
country 1. In this situation, cooperation would be desirable for country 1
but undesirable for country 2, which has not suffered the shock.
The above cases correspond to the “locomotive effect”, so that the shocks
would require the same policy response in the countries involved. There-
fore, it would be preferable not to coordinate. 
In contrast, different results would appear when expansionary (contrac-
tionary) demand shocks in a country of the union translate into a contrac-
tion (expansion) to the other country. In these cases, when the “beggar-thy-
-neighbour effect” prevails as in Figures 4 and 5, the shocks would require
a different policy response in the countries involved. In other words, coo-
peration would prove to be desirable.
The results are summarized in Table 1. For supply shocks, cooperation
always proves to be undesirable, but for demand shocks, the channel of
transmission would be determinant.
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FIGURE 2 Contractionary Shock in Both Countries. Cooperation Undesirable
FIGURE 3 Contractionary Supply Shock in Country 1:
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Union
The results for a monetary union coincide with those of the two-country
model in the cases of real and supply shocks. However, for monetary shocks,
since a monetary union does not allow for country-specific monetary shocks,
these would be transmitted in the same way leading to the “locomotive ef-
fect”. In other words, coordination would be always undesirable against mo-
netary shocks. Therefore, Figures 1, 2 and 3 will still apply for a monetary
union, but Figures 4 and 5 would only apply for real shocks.
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FIGURE 4 Expansionary Demand Shock in Country 1, Contractionary in Country 2:
Cooperation Desirable



















Monetary “Locomotive effect”: undesirable
“Beggar-thy-neighbour effect”: desirable
Real “Locomotive  effect”: undesirable
“Beggar-thy-neighbour effect”: desirable
Supply  Undesirable
TABLE 1 Desirability of Supply Policy Coordination in a Two-country Model
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ration always proves to be undesirable; but for real shocks, the channel of
transmission would be again determinant.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the desirability of coordinated supply-
-side intervention within a monetary union against shocks, provided that
the countries suffer some restrictions in the use of fiscal policy. In particu-
lar, we compared it with the case in which countries run independent mo-
netary policies.
From our analysis we concluded that a monetary union with some re-
strictions on fiscal policy would require less coordinated supply-side in-
tervention than a two-country model, since this would be desirable only 
for real shocks transmitted through the “beggar-thy-neighbour effect”. On
the contrary, when monetary policy is conducted at the national level (i.e.,
the no monetary union case), we find that country-specific monetary shocks
can lead to ambiguous effects across the two economies, depending on
the transmission mechanism, so that when they lead to the “beggar-thy-neigh-
bour effect”, there would appear an additional case for coordination.
In other words, coordinated supply-side intervention would be advised in
a monetary union only against real shocks transmitted through the “beg-
gar-thy-neighbour effect”. Therefore, in the rest of the cases supply-side po-
licies should be performed at the national level.
To summarize, coordination of supply-side policies would be useful only
against shocks requiring a different policy response in each economy in-
volved. For this reason, it would be crucial to know which would be thechan-
nel of transmission and thekind of disturbances actually prevailing in apar-
ticular monetary union.
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On the Desirability of Coordinated Supply-side
Intervention:
Does Monetary Union Matter?
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centrA, Spain (carmen.diazroldan@uclm.es)
This paper examines the desirability of coordinated supply-side intervention with-
in a monetary union, given the constraints on monetary and fiscal policy. The author
considers an economic framework featuring independent monetary policy. In gene-
ral, coordinated intervention is most useful against shocks that require distinct po-
licy responses in each separate economy.
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